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Abstract: This essay traces the literary development of David Hume’s moral philosophy in terms 
of an unresolved (perhaps unresolvable) conflict between two styles: the straightforward, 
unemotional style which Hume calls “anatomy” and the emotionally evocative style which he 
calls “painting.” Hume’s literary struggles were symptomatic of the conflicting obligations 
placed on authors in the print culture of Enlightenment Britain. Eighteenth-century authors were 
believed to have a responsibility to inform their readers, to provide them with clear, accurate 
insights on important topics. Authors, however, were also believed to have a responsibility to 
connect with their readers emotionally so as to allow for the creation of the sort of sentimental 
community so highly valued at the time. Only if such a union of hearts as well as minds was 
established successfully could printed texts evoke proper moral sentiments and hence become 
vehicles for both ethical improvement and social reform. While Hume began with a pure 
commitment to the anatomical approach, both he and his contemporaries quickly came to see this 
as an unacceptable literary practice. Hume thus began a series of attempts to combine both 
painting and anatomy in a single text, none of which proved entirely successful. While many 
commentators have been dissatisfied with either the lack of authentic emotion in Hume’s earliest 
work or with the lack of philosophical depth in his latter publications (or both), these problems 
must be understood in light of Hume’s continual efforts to meet the multiple, conflicting 
imperatives of Enlightenment print culture. 
2 
 
 
When David Hume wrote the Baron de Montesquieu “J’ai consacré ma vie à la 
philosophie et aux belles-lettres,”1 he was not describing himself as having two separate callings. 
His was a single vocation—one involving the expression of deep thought through beautiful 
writing.
2
 This vocation did not come naturally or easily to Hume. He struggled continually to 
reshape his approach to prose, famously renouncing the Treatise of Human Nature as a literary 
failure and radically revising the presentation of his philosophy in the Essays and two Enquiries. 
This essay will focus on Hume’s struggle between two modes of moral-philosophical 
composition prevalent in his day: the cold, unemotional style associated with experimental 
science that Hume metaphorically labels “anatomy” and the warm, rhetorical style which he 
labels “painting.”  
Hume’s literary development over the course of his repeated presentations of his moral-
philosophical ideas has already been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. For many 
years, the conventional wisdom was that enshrined by L. A. Selby-Bigge in the editor’s 
introduction to his edition of the Enquiries. The tale told by Selby-Bigge is one of stylistic 
progress but intellectual decline. While the Treatise is “ill-proportioned, incoherent [and] ill-
expressed,” the Enquiries display “elegance, lucidity and proporition.”3 Yet while the Treatise is 
a philosophical masterpiece despite its literary flaws, in the Enquiries Hume has come to write 
works of a “lower philosophical standard” meant for an elegant but unsophisticated lay 
                                                             
1 Letter 65, April 10, 1749, in The Letters of David Hume. 2 Vols. Edited by J. Y. T. Greig. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 133-138, p. 138. 
2 I owe this observation to M. A. Box, The Suasive Art of David Hume. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990, pp. 16-17. 
3
 Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the 
1777 Edition with Introduction and Analytical Notes by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Third Edition with Text Revised and 
Notes by P. H. Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1893/1902/1975, p. x. 
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audience.
4
 Yet just as Bigge’s editions came eventually came to give way to new editions of 
Hume’s writings, so too has his position on Hume’s philosophical decline given way to new, 
positive evaluations of the Essays and Enquiries as remarkable philosophical works in their own 
right.
5
 As so often happens, the counter-orthodoxy has become the orthodoxy, and there is now 
an air of mustiness to any philosophical dissatisfaction with Hume’s later work, perhaps 
something unscholarly about refusing to accede to Hume’s own judgment that of all his writings 
the second Enquiry was “incomparably the best.”6 Even if I am speaking only for myself, 
however, I must admit that at least some admirers of Hume’s thought still experience 
considerable disappointment with both the literary style of the Treatise and the philosophical 
depth of the Essays and Enquiries, finding it unfortunate that Hume was never able to express his 
best ideas using his best prose. The goal of this essay is not to defend my lukewarm evaluation of 
these works, but to explain the tensions in the literary culture of his day which led Hume to write 
as he did, tensions which may in turn then help explain why so many over the centuries have 
found Hume’s stylistic choices to be so deeply problematic.    
The key to understanding Hume’s literary development is to see that his struggle 
regarding painting and anatomy was not a solitary or idiosyncratic one. It was instead 
symptomatic of the conflicting obligations created by the relationship between authors and their 
readers in the print culture of Enlightenment Britain. Enlightenment authors were believed to 
have a responsibility to inform their readers, to provide them with accurate information on 
important topics. Doing so would suggest the adoption of an anatomical style. Yet these authors 
                                                             
4 Ibid., p. xiv. 
5 For a monograph devoted to refuting Bigge’s view of the first Enquiry, see Stephen Buckle, Hume’s Enlightenment 
Tract: The Unity and Purpose of “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.” New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. Other contributions to the voluminous literature devoted to salvaging the reputation of Hume’s later 
philosophical writings will be cited throughout this essay as the occasion arises.  
6 Hume, “My Own Life,” in Essays Moral Political and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Revised Edition. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985, , pp. xxxi-xli, p. xxxvi. Henceforth cited as “EMPL.” 
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were also believed to have a responsibility to engage their readers—not only to hold their interest 
as a necessary prerequisite for the transfer of knowledge, but also to connect with them 
emotionally so as to allow for the creation of the sort of sentimental community so highly valued 
in the eighteenth century. Only if authors succeeded in affectively connecting with the readers 
could texts hope to change hearts as well as minds, evoking proper moral sentiments and hence 
become vehicles for both ethical improvement and social reform. As a result, while Hume began 
with a more or less straightforward commitment to the anatomical approach, he came over time 
to attempt to combine both painting and anatomy in a single text. Doing so, he became 
convinced, was necessary in order to emotionally engage a wide readership while maintaining 
philosophical depth and accuracy. It is not clear, however, whether painting and anatomy can 
actually be combined in the way that Hume wished to combine them. As a result, the tensions 
between anatomy and painting continued to plague Hume’s philosophical composition. The 
conflicting demands placed on eighteenth century authors may never have been resolved 
adequately in his work. 
 Adam Potkay attributes the rise of a cold style of philosophical prose to the emergence 
of natural science, which in the minds of most eighteenth-century Britons had reached its apogee 
with Newton. The Royal Society and other institutional advocates of science in early modern 
Britain promoted an “experimental ideal” according to which “procedural rigor and a transparent 
language of argumentation should supplant the deceptions of eloquence in all essays addressed to 
the understanding.”7 Perhaps the most notable statement of this position is by John Locke: 
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric besides 
order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath 
invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and 
thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats. And therefore, however 
laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they 
                                                             
7 Adam Potkay, The Fate of Eloquence in the Age of Hume, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, p. 4. 
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are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided, 
and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either 
of the language or person that makes use of them.
8
 
 
At the same time as this dry style was emerging in the work of philosophers inspired by 
Newtonian science, however, emotional rhetoric remained highly popular. Peter Jones describes 
the preachers and teachers of Enlightenment Britain as showing a strong “bias towards practical 
eloquence rather than mere learning.”9 The warm rhetoric of the pulpit and lectern found itself 
competing with cold empiricism of the laboratory for the loyalties of the British intelligentsia. 
Enlightenment philosophers’ divided allegiances have led historians to debate whose side they 
were really on. Jones, Nicholas Phillipson and others emphasize the didactic side of the moral 
philosophy of the British Enlightenment, while P. B. Wood has criticized this emphasis to focus 
on its naturalistic, empiricist side. What the former camp sees as the development of an art of 
secularized preaching, the latter camp sees as the development of a science of human nature 
explicitly modeled on the natural sciences.
10
 The obvious resolution to this debate is that both 
sides are correct. While some British Enlightenment philosophers were preacherly moralists, 
others were quasi-scientific investigators of morality. Still others had conflicted loyalties, trying 
to negotiate a third way between the two camps. Hume’s corpus offers an excellent case study of 
precisely such an attempt at literary triangulation.  
                                                             
8 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) 3.10.34. Edited with an Introduction by Peter H. 
Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 508. As with all quotations from early modern English-
language sources in this essay, I have taken the liberty of modernizing punctuation and spelling for the sake of 
clarity, even in cases where the editor of the edition consulted has failed to do so.  
9 Peter Jones, “The Scottish Professoriate and the Polite Academy, 1720-1746” in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, 
eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, pp. 89-118, p. 90. See also Nicholas Phillipson, “Adam Smith as Civic Moralist,” in the 
same volume, pp. 179-202. 
10 P. B. Wood, “Hume, Reid and the Science of the Mind,” in Stewart and Wright, eds., op. cit., pp. 119-139. 
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Given that Hume famously believed that “reason is and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions,”11 it might seem that his primary loyalties would naturally lie with the rhetorical style. 
Yet Hume also introduces his philosophical debut, the Treatise of Human Nature, as “an attempt 
to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects” (T Cover). If Hume is 
indeed merely observing the operations of human passion in the same manner as Newton 
observed the orbits of the planets—and if his only goal is to describe these motions accurately—
then the dry, scientific style would seem to be necessary. The truth about human sentiments, like 
any other form of empirical fact, can only be determined properly through a combination of 
observation and inductive reasoning, not through emotional contagion. Hume thus complains in 
the Treatise that too often in philosophy “it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; 
and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has 
art enough to represent it in any favorable colors” (T Intro.2). Leaving warm eloquence to other 
works, Hume’s self-stated goal in the Treatise is only to present “the accurate anatomy of human 
nature” (T 1.4.7.23) in general the “anatomy of the mind” (T 2.1.12.2) in particular. 
Yet although Hume at first advocated an unsentimental examination of human 
sentiments, his commitment to dispassionate prose was soon challenged. Hume’s first attempts at 
literary triangulation began before the Treatise was even completed. The most important 
evidence to this effect comes from a letter of September 1739—after the publication of Books I 
and II of the Treatise, but before the publication of Book III, “Of Morals”—in which Hume 
responds to Francis Hutcheson’s feedback on a draft of this first statement of Hume’s ethics. 
“What affected me most in your remarks,” Hume tells his intellectual mentor, “is your observing 
that there wants a certain warmth in the cause of virtue, which, you think all good men would 
                                                             
11 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740). Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 2.3.3.4. Heneceforth cited as T. 
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relish and could not displease amidst abstract enquiries.” Hutcheson seems to have used a 
standard metaphor for impassioned eloquence—one even more popular in the eighteenth century 
than in the twenty-first—in which passionate prose is associated with heat, and dispassionate 
prose with coldness.
12
 Hume insists that his lack of warmth “has not happened by chance, but is 
the effect of a reasoning either good or bad.” His reasoning is as follows: 
There are different ways of examining the mind as well as the body. One may consider it 
either as an anatomist or as a painter: either to discover its most secret springs and 
principles or to describe the grace and beauty of its actions. I imagine it impossible to 
conjoin these two views. Where you pull off the skin and display all the minute parts, 
there appears something trivial even in the noblest attitudes and most vigorous actions. 
Nor can you ever render the object graceful or engaging but by clothing the parts again 
with skin and flesh and presenting only their bare outside. An anatomist, however, can 
give very good advice to a painter or statuary, and in like manner I am persuaded that a 
metaphysician may be very helpful to a moralist, though I cannot easily conceive these 
two characters united in the same work. Any warm sentiment of morals, I am afraid, 
would have the air of declamation amidst abstract reasonings, and would be esteemed 
contrary to good taste. And though I am much more ambitious of being esteemed a friend 
to virtue than a writer of taste, yet I must always carry the latter in my eye, otherwise I 
must despair of ever being serviceable to virtue. I hope these reasons will satisfy you, 
though at the same time, I intend to make a new trial, if it be possible to make the 
moralist and metaphysician agree a little better.
13
 
 
 Neither Hutcheson’s initial criticisms nor his response to Hume survive. A letter from the 
following year, however, finds Hume informing his mentor that he has “been very busy in 
correcting and finishing that discourse concerning morals which you perused.” Hume sent 
Hutcheson the revised version of the conclusion to Book III as evidence.
14
 This revised 
conclusion may be the “new trial” of which Hume wrote earlier. Sure enough, in the published 
version of that conclusion, Hume repeats the analogical reasoning he already used in his 
correspondence. Here, he writes: 
                                                             
12 “Heat,” Potkay observes, “fairly pervades earlier eighteenth-century discussions of eloquence” (Potkay, op. cit., p. 
26). 
13 Letter 13, September 17, 1739, in Grieg, ed., Vol. I, pp. 32-33. 
14 Letter 15, March 4 1740, Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 36-38 
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The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and 
portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body pretend to give his figures any 
graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even something hideous or at least 
minute in the views of things which he presents; and it is necessary the objects should be 
set more at a distance, and be more covered up from sight, to make them engaging to the 
eye and imagination. An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a 
painter, and it is even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the 
former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connection, 
before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract 
speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become 
subservient to practical morality, and may render this latter science more correct in its 
precepts, and more persuasive in its exhortations (T 3.3.6.6). 
 
 The same double analogy is presented a third time in the first section of the 1748 
Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding—retitled An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding in 1758 —albeit now with the greater eloquence characteristic of Hume’s 
later work: 
An artist must be better qualified… who, besides a delicate taste and a quick 
apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of 
the understanding, the workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment 
which discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry 
may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with 
success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents 
to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects, but his science is useful to the 
painter in delineating even a Venus or a Helen. While the latter employs all the richest 
colors of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs, he must still 
carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body: the position of the muscles, 
the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in 
every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. In vain 
would we exalt the one by depreciating the other (EHU 1.8).
15
 
 
Indeed, the entire first section of the first Enquiry, “On the Different Species of 
Philosophy,” can be read as an elaboration of the analogical reasoning introduced almost a 
decade earlier.
16
 “As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable,” one species of 
authors “paint her in the most amiable colors, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence.” 
                                                             
15
 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beuachamp. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000. Henceforth cited as EHU. 
16 For a close reading of this section of the first Enquiry, see Buckle, op. cit., pp. 121-128. 
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Such eloquent writers “make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and 
regulate our sentiments.” Hume here indicates for the first time the precise techniques that 
painters can adopt to evoke moral sentiments in their readers, most notably their use of vivid 
examples. Painters of virtue, he explains, “select the most striking observations and instances 
from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths 
of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest 
precepts and most illustrious examples” (EHU 1.1). As is typical of pre-romantic aesthetics, 
Hume sees the painter’s art as essentially mimetic. Painters strive to recreate segments of reality 
as accurately as possible, and their success can be judged by a representation’s ability to evoke 
the same sentiments which the objects depicted would evoke were they directly available to our 
observation.
17
 “All polite letters,” Hume insists, “are nothing but pictures of human life in 
various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame, 
admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set before us” (EHU 
1.2). 
Anatomists of morals, on the other hand, “regard human nature as a subject of 
speculation, and with a narrow scrutiny examine it in order to find those principles which 
regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular 
object, action or behavior.” Anatomists treat their examples as data for use in inductive reasoning 
rather than as valuable in themselves, “proceeding from particular instances to general principles, 
they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive 
at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded.” 
                                                             
17 The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, himself clearly a painter of morality, provides an helpful description of the goals of 
such painting along these pre-romantic lines. For a thorough analysis of Shaftesbury’s The Moralists: A 
Philosophical Rhapsody as a piece of pre-romantic moral painting, see Michael B. Gill, The British Moralists and 
the Birth of Secular Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 100-112. 
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What is more, anatomists, unlike painters, do not attempt to reach a general audience. Since 
“their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the 
approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the 
labor of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the 
instruction of posterity” (EHU 1.2). 
If anatomists do happen to find some common readers, these readers may not only be 
confused and left cold; they may even be repulsed by what they read. Just as the body of even the 
greatest beauty disgusts us if it is cut open on a dissecting table, moral anatomy makes even the 
greatest virtue seem—borrowing Hume’s own words—“trivial,” “disagreeable,” and even 
“hideous.” This last choice of terms is particularly revealing. As Michael Gill has pointed out, 
the OED gives as a second definition of “hideous:” “terrible, distressing or revolting to the moral 
sense,” providing examples of this usage from 1692 and 1863. 18  
Hume’s analogical use of anatomy to suggest the off-putting effects of a certain kind of 
moral philosophy is hardly original.
19
 Among the treatises written by the hack persona behind 
Jonathan Swift’s 1704 A Tale of a Tub—alongside such imagined masterpieces as A Panegyrical 
Essay upon the Number Three and A General History of Ears—there is a fictional publication 
called Lectures upon a Dissection of Human Nature. Swift’s narrator explains, “I have… 
dissected the carcass of human nature and read many useful lectures upon the several parts, both 
containing and contained, till at last it smelt so strong I could preserve it no longer.”20 Even 
worse, in the introduction to the Fable of the Bees, Bernard Mandeville writes that:  
                                                             
18 Michael B. Gill, “A Philosopher in his Closet: Reflexivity and Justification in Hume’s Moral Theory,” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy. 26:2 (1996), pp. 231-255, fn. 10, p. 236. 
19 For a thorough review of Hume’s predecessors in this regard, see M. A. Stewart, “Two Species of Philosophy: 
The Historical Significance of the First Enquiry,” in Peter Millican, ed., Reading Hume on Human Understanding. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 67-96, pp. 71-72. 
20Jonathan Swift, “A Tale of a Tub” (1704), in A Tale of a Tub and Other Works.  Edited by Angus Ross and David 
Woolley. Oxford World Classics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 2, p. 59. 
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…as those that study the anatomy of dead carcasses may see that the chief organs and 
nicest springs more immediately required to continue the motion of our machine are not 
hard bones, strong muscles and nerves, nor the smooth white skin that so beautifully 
covers them, but small trifling films and little pipes… so they that examine into the 
nature of man… may observe that what renders him a sociable animal, consists not in his 
desire of company, good nature, pity, affability, and other graces of a fair outside, but that 
his vilest and most hateful qualities are the most necessary accomplishments to fit him for 
the largest, and, according to the world, the happiest and most flourishing societies.
21
 
 
Hume does not want to disgust the reader of the Treatise in this way. To the contrary, he 
hopes that readers of his accurate anatomy of our moral sentiments will become convinced that 
“not only virtue must be approved of, but also the sense of virtue—and not only that sense, but 
also the principles from whence it is derived—so that nothing is presented on any side, but what 
is laudable and good.” At the conclusion of the Treatise, Hume observes that “were it proper in 
such a subject to bribe the readers assent, or employ anything but solid argument, we are here 
abundantly supplied with topics to engage the affections” (T 3.3.6.3). The implication, however, 
is that while Hume’s moral anatomy could conceivably be framed to as to evoke reader’s 
positive emotions, such affective “bribery” is not proper in philosophy. It would be easy for 
someone who has demonstrated the truth of an anti-Mandevillian anatomy of virtue to lure 
readers into a love of morality, but this would be rhetorical eloquence, not “solid argument,” and 
hence precluded by the genre rules of the philosophical treatise.  
Yet if engaging the affections to support the love of virtue were truly impermissible in a 
philosophical work, Hume could have easily refrained from doing so at all. The conclusion of the 
Treatise is not the transcript of an extemporaneous lecture, but a repeatedly revised piece of 
polished prose. When Hume insists that evoking rather than merely describing our moral 
sentiments is impermissible in such a work, it only serves to strengthen the eloquence of this 
very evocation. Hume employs a similar device in the second Enquiry, when he catches himself 
                                                             
21 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Publick Benefits. 1714/1729. With a Commentary 
by F. B. Kaye. 2 Vols. Indianaplois, IN: Liberty Fund, 1988, p. 3 
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in the midst of a rhapsody on the virtue of benevolence. “But I forget,” he writes, “that it is not 
my present business to recommend generosity and benevolence, or to paint, in their true colors, 
all the genuine charms of the social virtues.”22 M. A. Box’s analysis of this passage applies 
equally well to its analogue in the Treatise: 
Initially this seems a plain denial of any hortatory intentions. But on the other hand it is 
also plainly an admission that he has just been engaged in recommending a virtue and 
painting its charms. Hume is being arch. He has not really caught himself in getting 
carried away; he is just imitating, as eighteenth-century prose stylists tended to do, the 
casual discontinuities, hesitations, afterthoughts and backpedallings of actual 
conversation. If his commendatory painting of benevolence were really a deviation from 
his intentions, he could easily have struck it out. The only reason for failing to revise his 
discussion of benevolence is that it did indeed reflect his intentions.
23
   
 
 The fact remains, of course, that Hume confines the explicit engagement of the reader’s 
affections to the conclusion of the Treatise, and that the rest of the work fails to evoke significant 
emotional reactions. At the same time, however, it is the moral anatomy which dominated the 
work until this point that has “abundantly supplied” the material which is deployed in the 
conclusion to evoke warm engagement. If nothing else, this proves that moral anatomy can 
indeed be useful to the painter of virtue—the painter whom Hume himself becomes, however 
briefly, in the conclusion to the Treatise.  
 Hume did seem to think that a painterly approach might harm the reception of the 
Treatise. He suggested to Hutcheson that moments of warm rhetoric scattered across a work of 
cold, abstract reasoning would be seen as contrary to good taste. Yet why is so much abstract 
reasoning necessary in the first place? It must be because Hume essentially agreed with Locke 
that it was the only sure path to truth. The thrust of the first section of the first Enquiry is 
therefore not a value-neutral description of the two species of philosophy described, but an 
                                                             
22 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Edited by Tom L. Beuachamp. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998, 2.1.5. Henceforth cited as EPM. 
23 Box, op. cit., p. 16. My  application of Box’s point to the conclusion of the Treatise serves as a refutation of Gill’s 
contrary reading in Gill, 2006, op. cit., pp. 310-311. 
13 
 
apology for careful, abstract anatomy addressed to a readership Hume assumes to be favorably 
disposed only to painting. And if dry argument is indeed the path to truth generally, this truth is 
of the utmost importance when it comes to moral subjects “as may have a direct reference to 
action and society” (EHU 1.6).  
 If Hume’s analogical reasoning holds correct, however, then they only way to prove that 
the beauty of virtue is more than skin deep is to flay it, hence destroying this very beauty. 
Dissection, even of the most genuinely attractive human body, is an inherently grisly business. 
As Swift noted, it will, in time, inevitably produce a stench. Hume is thus deeply concerned that 
“there is no virtue or moral duty, but what may, with facility, be refined away… in sifting and 
scrutinizing it, by every captious rule of logic, in every light or position, in which it may be 
placed.” To be sure, Hume holds that those who escape the genuine authority of morality in this 
way are indulging in a “false philosophy,”24 but there is reason to worry that even accurate moral 
anatomy may have similar results. 
 The question is how to conduct an accurate anatomy of morality without dismembering 
our moral sentiments in the process. By the time of the first Enquiry, Hume has abandoned his 
insistence that painting and anatomy be kept separate. Now, he will instead attempt to “unite the 
boundaries of the different species of philosophy” (EHU 1.17), though it is unclear precisely how 
this is to be accomplished. The literary technique adopted in the Treatise—apologetically 
appending a painterly conclusion to what is otherwise an essentially anatomical work—did not 
prove successful. This is not to say that the bulk of the Treatise was composed without 
belletristic goals in mind. Box describes Hume’s literary intentions in his first work thusly: 
Hume says here that an anatomist should not attempt to prettify the dissected object, but 
he does not say that the procedures of anatomy themselves cannot be more or less 
beautiful. Just as the dexterity and precision with which an anatomist wields his scalpel 
                                                             
24 Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in EMPL,  pp. 465-487, p. 482. 
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can be marvelous, the manner in which Hume philosophized could be too. Similarly an 
anatomist’s lectures, and Hume’s presentation of his findings, could be entertaining as 
well as instructive. Accordingly in the Treatise Hume did not try to beautify moral 
sentiments in order to recommend morality to his readers, but he did try to make the 
anatomizing of sentiment as marvelous for readers as he found it himself.
25
  
 
Hume, however, failed to achieve even this relatively modest literary goal. Rather than 
feeling wonder at his anatomical report, Hume’s earliest readers felt at best indifference and 
confusion, at worst hostility towards an author they saw as seeking to undermine their moral 
convictions. Although later generations may have come to disagree, for its first readers Hume’s 
anatomy of morals was indeed hideous and disagreeable. 
Later in life, Hume was to conclude that his “want of success in publishing the Treatise 
of Human Nature had proceeded more from the manner than the matter.”26 While many have 
interpreted this to imply that Hume wished simply to improve the presentation of his anatomy 
with a dash of painterly style, Kate Abramson has convincingly demonstrated that Hume now 
sought a thoroughgoing synthesis of anatomy and painting—one which required him to rethink 
his entire compositional approach.
27
 Success in this regard, however, was not to come until after 
Hume attempted another failed experiment. 
The initial volume of Hume’s Essays Moral and Political was published a mere year after 
the 1740 publication of the third book of the Treatise. Hume’s literary model for these essays 
was Joseph Addison. This decision to ape the Addisonian style was not an unusual one in 
Enlightenment Scotland. The Spectator was reprinted in Edinburgh after first appearing in 
                                                             
25 Box, op. cit., p. 238. 
26 Hume, “My Own Life,” in EMPL, pp. xxxi-xli, p. xxxv. 
27 See Kate Abramson, Hume’s Peculiar Sentiments: The Evolution of Hume’s Moral Philosophy. Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago, 1997; Abramson, “Sympathy and the Project of 
Hume’s Second Enquiry,” Archiv f. Geshichte d. Philosophie 83 (2000), pp. 45-80; Abramson, “Happy to Unite, or 
Not?” Philosophy Compass 1:3 (2006), pp. 290-302; and Abramson, “Hume’s Distinction between Philosophical 
Anatomy and Painting,” Philosophy Compass 2:5 (2007), pp. 680-698. 
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London, and its conversational essays were widely imitated throughout Great Britain.
28
 In the 
advertisement to the first, 1741 volume of his essays, Hume makes his debt to Addison explicit, 
explaining that his initial plan was to follow Addison’s model in terms of both literary style and 
mode of initial publication: “Most of these essays were wrote with a view of being published as 
weekly papers, and were intended to comprehend the designs both of the Spectators and 
Craftsmen. But having dropped the undertaking… before I ventured on to any more serious 
compositions, I was induced to commit these trifles to the judgment of the public.”29  
Hume seems to have been most influenced by Addison’s ambition to bring “philosophy 
out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables 
and in coffee-houses.”30 If only the great philosophers of antiquity had access to the technology 
of printing, Addison is convinced that they would have made use of it “to diffuse good sense 
through the bulk of a people, to clear up their understandings, animate their minds with virtue, 
dissipate the sorrows of a heavy heart, or unbend the mind from its more severe employments 
with innocent amusements.”31 In his early essay “Of Essay Writing,” which seems to have been 
intended as a mission statement for his aborted periodical, Hume celebrates the “league betwixt 
the learned and conversable worlds, which is so happily begun,” and presents himself as an 
“ambassador from the dominions of learning to those of conversation.”32 In the name of all those 
of “sound understandings and delicate affections,” the learned ambassador proposes an alliance 
                                                             
28 For the influence of Addison on the Scottish Enlightenment, see Phillipson, op. cit.   
29 As Cited in Box, op. cit., p. 113. Despite Hume’s mention of the partisan Craftsman, it is clear that the non-
partisan Hume’s literary debts were primarily to The Spectator. 
30 Joseph Addison, Spectator, #10 (March 12, 1711) in Erin Mackie, ed. The Commerce of Everyday Life: Selections 
from The Tatler and The Spectator. Boston: Bedford/ St. Martin’s, 1998, p.89. Hume may have also been inspired in 
this regard by the third Earl of Shaftesbury, who complained that philosophy “is no longer active in the world, nor 
can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the public stage. We have immured her (poor lady!) in colleges and 
cells, and have set her servilely to such works as those in the mines” “The Moralists” 1.1, as included in 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1732). 3 Vols. Foreword by Douglas Den Uyl. Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund, 2001,Vol. II pp. 101-247, p. 105. Hume and Addison, however, were united in rejecting 
Shaftebury’s ornate, aristocratic style with a simpler mode of composition more amenable to public tastes. 
31 Addison, Spectator #124 (July 23, 1711), in Mackie, ed., pp. 95-96. 
32 “Of Essay Writing,” in EMPL, pp. 533-537, p. 535. 
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against “our common enemies, against the enemies of reason and beauty, people of dull heads 
and cold hearts.”33 Far from a sacrifice on the part of philosophers in service to the multitude—
far from a return from the light of reason to the darkness of Plato’s cave—this alliance will 
actually help the learned better achieve their own goal, that of abstract truth. Hume’s reasoning 
here is characteristically empiricist: 
Learning has been a great loser by being shut up in colleges and cells, and secluded from 
the world and good company… Even philosophy went to wrack by this moping recluse 
method of study, and became as chimerical in her conclusions as she was unintelligible in 
her style and manner of delivery. And indeed, what could be expected from men who 
never consulted experience in any of their reasonings, or who never searched for that 
experience, where alone it is to be found, in common life and conversation?
34
 
 
The main problem with this alliance, however, is that the learned are forced to leave their 
best weapons at the border of the conversable realm. Addison has never been admired as a great 
thinker, and the highly informal Addisonian essay is an inappropriate form for the 
communication of correct reasoning on difficult subjects, especially when compared to the 
success of the dry, Lockean treatise in this regard. Addison’s work is, as Hume acknowledges, 
“trifling,” and Hume in hindsight describes his own worst essays as giving “neither pleasure nor 
instruction,” being merely “bad imitations of the agreeable trifling of Addison.”35 The most 
Addisonian and trifling of Hume’s early essays—including “Of Essay Writing” itself—were 
excluded from later collections of Hume’s writings.36 Box gives a devastating account of the 
intentional “superficiality,” the “utter emptiness of new or even rigorous thought,” which 
characterizes these withdrawn pieces: 
                                                             
33 Ibid., p. 536. Hume’s extended ambassadorial metaphor is problematically gendered—depicting women as the 
sovereigns of the kingdom of affection and conversation, while men are sovereigns of the realm of learning—in 
ways that relate in very complex ways with today’s feminist critique of the opposition to emotion in mainstream 
Anglo-American philosophy. On this topic—in addition to Jacobson, ed., op cit.—see Lívia Guimarãs, “The Gallant 
and the Philosopher,” Hume Studies 30:1 (2004), pp. 127-148. 
34 “Of Essay Writing,” in EMPL, pp. 534-535. 
35
 Letter 468, To William Strahan, February 7, 1772, in Grieg, ed., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 257. 
36 See Box, op. cit., Chapter III (pp. 111-162) and Norah Smith, “Hume’s Rejected Essays,” Forum For Modern 
Language Studies 8 (1972), pp. 354-371. 
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Elsewhere in the Essays, where he is not walking so closely in Mr. Spectator’s steps, 
Hume can be found advancing new theories and insights, but not in the apprentice pieces, 
where instead he propounds the following trivial theses: that learning is a desirable 
conversational trait, that philosophical enthusiasm is to be eschewed, that members of the 
middle class should be content with their station, that impudence is to be distinguished 
from decent self-confidence, that marriages would be happier if spouses did not seek 
dominance, that it would be good for women to read books of history, and that avarice is 
a ridiculous vice.
37
 
 
All of these theses may be true (although I have my doubts about the value of middle-
class complacency), but these truths are both trivial and were universally accepted in Hume’s 
time. Yet while it is easy to dismiss the early essays as a naked attempt for popular success on 
the heels of the failure of the Treatise, the same is not true of the still-painterly works that 
followed.
38
 A thorough reading of Hume’s Essays and Enquiries (collected together as Essays 
and Treatises on Several Subjects) would reveal that Hume soon improved markedly in his 
ability to combine eloquent, emotionally evocative writing with profound and original thought.
39
 
Hume struggled toward a synthesis of Locke and Addison, developing (in Box’s apt phrase) a 
unique genre of “essays which are not quite essays,”40 as the change in the title of the first 
Enquiry seems to indicate.
41
  As has already been mentioned, Hume insisted at the end of his life 
                                                             
37 Box, op. cit., p. 127. 
38 John Immerwahr warns us against the tendency of philosophers today to dismiss all of Hume’s work except the 
Treatise, seeing all of the later, more popular work as evidence that Hume had “’sold out, deserting his serious work 
to write popular trifles for fame and profit.” See John Immerwahr, “The Anatomist and the Painter: The Continuity 
of Hume’s Treatise and Essays,” Hume Studies 17:1 (1991), pp. 1-14, p. 12. Such a dismissive attitude is, however, 
justified to a significant extent if it is limited only to the withdrawn essays, which even Hume himself admitted were 
mere “trifles,” and bad ones at that. 
39 Perhaps the greatest of Hume’s Essays in this regard is the sequence of four pieces on happiness named after the 
schools of Hellenistic philosophy: “The Epicurean,” “The Stoic,” “The Platonist,” and “The Skeptic.” For my own 
take on these essays, see Frazer, The Enlightenment of Sympathy, op. cit., pp. 61-63. For a fuller discussion, see 
Heydt, op. cit. Heydt notes that, in these four essays, Hume “provides us with a rhetorical performance that might 
have satisfied Hutcheson’s expectations for a work on morals” (p. 9). 
40 Box, op. cit., p. 174.  
41 M. A. Stewart has observed that there appears to have been a similar change in the title of the second Enquiry, 
albeit one made before its initial publication. See Stewart in Millican, ed., op. cit., p. 81, fn. 30. That said, it is 
important to realize that the English language genre names for different types of philosophical writing—like the 
philosophical terminology of the time more generally—was never terribly precise. The words “essay” and “treatise” 
were used loosely, and sometimes even interchangeably, as is evidenced by the fact that the second of Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government is described on its title page as “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End 
of Civil Government.” See Box, op. cit., p. 94. 
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that of all his writings An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is “incomparably the 
best.”42 Commentators now generally agree that it was here that Hume came closest to a 
successful combination of anatomy and painting.
43
  
Contrasting Book III of the Treatise with the second Enquiry, Hume scholars have noted 
two major changes. First, the most difficult and controversial arguments of the Treatise have 
either been removed or confined to a series of appendices, keeping the stench of anatomy away 
from the main body of the work. Second, Hume illustrates virtually every point with concrete 
examples, drawing most of them from actual history. As Hume already noted in the first Enquiry, 
vivid illustrations are the central technique of moral painting, engaging the reader in a way that 
general principles never could. Our moral sentiments are not affective responses to abstractions, 
after all, but to the observable behavior of particular individuals. As Hume put it in his 
(withdrawn, Addisonian) essay “On the Study of History,” “When a philosopher contemplates 
characters and manners in his closet, the general abstract view of the objects leaves the mind so 
cold and unmoved, that the sentiments of nature have no room to play, and he scarce feels the 
difference between vice and virtue.” A historian, by contrast, “places the objects in their true 
point of view,” and hence develops “a lively sentiment of blame and praise.”44  
As this passage indicates, it is not poets and preachers, but historians, who are for Hume 
the best painters of virtue. Hume writes that while poets “can paint virtue in the most charming 
colors,” their undisciplined imaginations often lead them to “become advocates for vice.” By 
contrast, “historians have been, almost without exception, the true friends of virtue, and have 
always represented it in its proper colors, however they may have erred in their judgments of 
                                                             
42 “My Own Life,” in EMPL, p. xxxvi. 
43
 See, e.g., Baier, op cit., p. 543 and Baier, “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: Incomparably the Best?” 
In Radcliffe, ed., op. cit., pp. 293-320; Abramson, 2000, op. cit., p. 64; and Box, op. cit., p. 238. 
44 “On the Study of History,” in EMPL, pp. 563-568, p. 568. 
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particular persons.”45 It is in the second Enquiry that Hume combined the anatomy of his 
Treatise with the accurate and emotionally evocative narrative paintings of his (at the time much 
more successful) History of England.
46
 
Such, at least, was Hume’s goal. Whether he was fully successful in attaining it is another 
matter. Certainly, Hume was well aware that he might successfully identify the proper norms 
communicative practice without possessing the talents necessary to master it himself. For 
example, although Hume felt that the art of oratory was an indispensable means of instilling 
proper moral sentiments in a political community, he was so abashed about his Scottish accent 
that he tried to avoid speaking in public.
 47
 While Hume undoubtedly had a far higher estimation 
of his literary than his oratorical abilities, Stephen Buckle interprets the apologetic tone of the 
first section of the first Enquiry as an indication of “Hume’s awareness that his success in 
combining the two kinds of philosophy was likely to be judged (or prejudged) as less than total, 
at least by his suspected audience.”48  
There is admittedly something awkward about the second Enquiry’s excess of 
appendices, and something off-putting about its continuous digressions from philosophy into the 
deeds of ancient Greeks and Romans. It is not implausible to claim, with Box, that Hume never 
quite attained what he was trying to achieve in the second Enquiry, and that his friend Adam 
                                                             
45 Hume, “Of the Study of History,” in EMPL, pp. 563-568, p. 567. 
46 For an alternative account of Hume’s turn to history see James Noxon, Hume’s Philosophical Development: A 
Study of his Methods. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Noxon argues that Hume has now come to realize 
that moral, political and social theory “can be based directly upon the historical study of political events without 
involving any intricate psychological investigation” (p. 25). There is no contradiction between Noxon’s explanation 
and my own; history may both be more emotionally engaging than moral anatomy and capable of standing on its 
own as a source of moral and political insight, hence rendering Hume’s turn to history overdetermined. For a recent 
attempt to read Hume’s History as a kind of political theory, see Andre Sabl, Hume’s Politic: Coordination and 
Crisis in the “History of England.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. 
47 See Marc Hanvelt, The Politics of Eloquence: David Hume’s Polite Rhetoric. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2012. Hanvelt insists that the fascinating analysis of Hume’s position on oratory thus cannot be applied to 
Hume’s own communicative practices, which were largely limited to the written word (see, e.g., p. 34). Yet much 
(though not all) of Hanvelt’s analysis can in fact be applied to Hume’s writing if we make allowances for the 
different applications of the underlying principles of rhetoric to various media of communication. 
48 Buckle, op. cit., p. 23. 
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Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments might serve as a better example of success in the genre.49 
Clearly expressing a profound and original moral theory without artificial recourse to 
appendices, Smith continuously integrates concrete examples into his theory in the form of 
eloquent narratives—narratives drawn, less often from history and the classics, and more often 
from homely experiences that his readers could recognize from their own lives.
50
 For most of the 
twentieth century, when Hume’s work loomed over all Anglo-American ethics and Smith’s 
moral philosophy was essentially ignored, it might have seemed absurd to suggest that Smith’s 
Theory was literarily superior to Hume’s second Enquiry. Today, however, as Smith’s ethics 
becomes ever-more appreciated, Box’s judgment is gaining increasing plausibility. 
Smith’s Theory was certainly praised by Smith’s contemporaries for its literary 
achievements in terms that Hume must have envied. Edmund Burke praises Smith in his 
correspondence for his “elegant painting of the manners and passions,”51 and goes on to praise 
the Theory in print as “one of the most beautiful fabrics of moral theory, that has perhaps ever 
appeared.” Such a work, Burke continues, must not be subject to the deformations of anatomical 
dissection. “A dry abstract of the system would convey no juster idea of it,” he says, “than the 
skeleton of a departed beauty would of her form when she was alive; at the same time the work 
is so well methodized, the parts grow so naturally and gracefully out of each other, that it would 
be doing it equal injustice to show it by broken and detached pieces.”52 To be sure, we might 
                                                             
49 See Box, op. cit., p. 255. 
50 On Smith’s use of these homely yet literary “illustrations,” see Phillipson, op. cit., p. 182. 
51 Letter 38, From Edmund Burke, 10 September 1759, Correspondence of Adam Smith. Edited by Ernest Campbell 
Mossner and Ian Simpson Ross. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1987, pp. 46-47, p. 47. 
52 Edmund Burke, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments, by Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the 
University of Glasgow,” The Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics and Literature of the Year 1759. 
London: R. and J. Dodsley, 1760, pp. 484-489, pp. 484-485. Burke himself was of course a master of evoking 
emotion in his readers. Thomas Paine complains that in the Reflections on the Revolution in France “the tragic 
paintings by which Mr. Burke has outraged his own imagination and seeks to work upon that of his readers... are 
very well calculated for theatrical representation… and accommodated to produce… a weeping effect.” See Thomas 
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dismiss this praise of Smith as the sort of hyperbolic flattery often exchanged by eighteenth 
century men of letters seeking to win one another’s good graces. Even if Burke’s praise of Smith 
is exaggerated, however, the anti-anatomical language used to formulate this praise is suggestive 
of the eighteenth-century literary ideals which Hume struggled so long to meet, and which he 
may never have succeeded in meeting to either his or others’ satisfaction.  
Yet Hume’s failures as a philosophical-literary stylist do nothing to diminish his 
achievements, not merely as a philosopher in general, but as a philosophical theorist of literary 
style itself. An eighteenth-century author who was somehow able to fuse the compositional 
modes of the anatomist and the painter without significant strain might never have been so 
acutely aware of the conflicting demands of the literary norms of the era. Hume’s authorial 
struggles are therefore  an invaluable resource, not only for historians of the print culture of 
Eighteenth century Britain, but also for philosophers and writers who still wrestle with analogous 
problems today. 
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